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In the Supreme Court
of the State of Utah
OSCAR HACKFORD,
Plaintiff,

vs.

Case No. 9330

THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION
OF UTAH,
Defendant.

DEFENDANT'S BRIEF

STATEMENT OF FACTS

Except for the statement that plaintiff was employed
as a sheepherder on December 31, 1957 by Deseret Livestock Company and that he was injured in the course
of his employment on the said date, defendant can accept
very little of plaintiff's statement of facts and therefore
desires to restate the facts as follows:
Plaintiff was injured on December 31, 1957 during
the course of his employment at a wage of $200 per month
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by Deseret Livestock Company. The team of horses which
he was managing became startled and ran away. One or
more wheels of the wagon ran over his pelvis.
Deseret Livestock Company is a Utah corporation
which operates farms and ranches in Utah and elsewhere
and was a self-insurer under the workmen's Compensation
Act at the time of the accident. The accident occured in
Skull Valley, Utah, west of Tooele, Utah.
Immediately after the accident, plaintiff was taken
to the nearest hospital, which was in Tooele, Utah, where
he was X-rayed and treated by Dr. J. Herbert Milburn,
M.D., of 154 South Main, Street, Tooele, Utah. The X-rays
of Dr. Milburn taken at the time of his admission to the
Tooele Hospital and again at the time of his release about
ten weeks later, showed that the plaintiff had suffered a
fractured pelvis but that the fracture had nicely healed.
There was no indication whatsoever that there was any
fracture of the spine as alleged in plaintiff's statement of
facts.
After his release, plaintiff continued to complain of
some discomfort and pain, and after consultation between
the company's management and Dr. Milburn, plaintiff was
referred to Dr. A. M. Okelberry, who is generally recognized by his profession as well as laymen as being an outstanding physician in this particular line. Dr. Okelberry
examined plaintiff on or about August 9, 195-8, and a report
from Dr. Okelberry was sent to the company, to Dr. Milburn and to the Utah Industrial Commission (R-2).
In this report, Dr. Okelberry among other things stat-
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ed that "There was relatively little displacement, and in
the film taken in April, union of the fractures was well
established." He further indicated that "While operative
treatment might be required to get this man back to work,
it was believed advisable to provide him with a course of
eight or ten physiotherapy treatments consisting of heat
massage, and special exercises to improve his strength.
He will be seen for a check up examination and reevaluation in a couple of weeks. Arrangements have b.-:::2n made
for Mr. Tage S. Sponbeck to carry out the treatments
required."
Plaintiff continued under Dr. Okelberry's treatments
and care but was haphazard in keeping his appointments.
Since he refused to take the doctor's advice and to keep
certain appointments, in May, 1959, the employer company
stopped paying compensation to him to bring matters to
a head. Stopping the compensation checks had the desired
effect, and on June 13, 1959 plaintiff again presented himself for reexamination. A report of the results of this reexamination was prepared by Dr. Okelberry under date
of July 6, 1959 (R-9) and submitted to the employer company, the Industrial Commission, and others. Part of this
report states:
"Since it has not been possible to obtain a satisfactory result from the conservative methods of
treatment which have been provided, and since he
has been likewise unable to obtain any lasting relief
from the numerous chiropractic treatments which
he has apparently had, he was again advised to
have a myelogram examination. With this procedure it should be possible to arrive at a still more
definite diagnosis and thereby be more positive
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about advising treatment. From a clinical standpoint, I believe his lumbrosacral joint should . be
explored for a disc rupture and a bone graft fuswn
done. Since Mr. Hackford does not wish to avail
himself of this additional diagnostic measure, or
further treatment I believe that a settlement
should be reached ~ith him on an estimated partial
permanent disability that would be expected were
he to submit to the treatment above indicated. This
partial disability is estimated at 15 per cent of loss
of bodily function."
On June 15, 1959 by letter (R-5) plaintiff requesed
permission to change his doctor from Dr. Okelberry to Dr.
E. F. Walters of 925 East South Temple, Salt Lake City,
Utah, who is listed as an osteopathic physician and surgeon. The employer company opposed this change of doctors on the grounds that it was not to the best inteTests of
plaintiff (R-4), and the Industrial Commission denied
plaintiff's request (R-6).
Thereafter, on or about July 2, 1959, plaintiff filed
an application with the Industrial Commission for determination of his claim (R-7, R-8).
Pursuant to the statute (37-1-77, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as amended), the Industrial Comlnission referred the medical aspects of the case to a medical panel
on August 11, 1959 (R-16) consisting of Boyd G. Holbrook,
M.D., Chairman; S. W. Allred, M.D.; and Norman R. Beck,
M.D. Also pursuant to the same statute, the panel made
its report to the Industrial Commission on September 21,
1959, with all members of the panel signing the report
(R-17, R-18, R-19). After giving detailed results of the
examination, the panel report concludes:
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"1. No further treatment or study is indicated.

"2. This man has 15 per cent loss of bodily
function as a result of the accident and injuries he
sustained."
Plaintiff filed objection to the report of the medical
panel (R-20) on or about October 19, 1959. But then instead
of pursuing this objection at this time, plaintiff through
his attorney attempted to bypass the Industrial Commission and the procedure set up by statute for such matters
and filed a complaint against Deseret Livestock Company
in the District Court of Salt Lake County, State of Utah
(Case No. 124694) seeking judgment against the employer
company. The employer company was served with a summons in this case March 10, 1960, and in due tim~ entered
a special appearance to make a motion to dismiss the complaint on the grounds the district court had no jurisdiction,
which motion was granted by the district court on March
24, 1960.
On March 31, 1960 plaintiff asked for a hearing on
his objections to the medical panel report and pointed out
that the doctors making the report should be required to
attend to be available for examination and cross-examination (R-22). Shortly thereafter, on April 19, 1960, the
commission called a hearing on the plaintiff's application
for adjustment of claim (R-23), and pursuant to said call
the hearing was held May 16, 1960, presided over by Commission Chairman Otto W. Wiesley as referee, and attended by all members of the said medical panel as well as the
parties and their attorneys.

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

6

On June 16, 1960, the commission rendered its decision, which decision, signed by all members of the commission, found that the said accident had resulted in
permanent partial disability of 15 per cent loss of bodily
function which would entitle plaintiff to compensation for
30 weeks at $35 per week, or $1,050; further that any disability over and above the 15 per cent loss of bodily function was caused by degenerative arthritis not related to
or aggravated by the injury. (R-61, R-62).
On July 7, 1960 plaintiff filed a motion for rehearing
(R-63), which motion was denied (R-64). From this denial
order plaintiff obtained a writ of review from this court.

STATEMENT OF POINTS
POINT I.
PLAINTIF~ WAS NOT DEPRIVED OF LIFE,
LIBERTY, OR PROPERTY WITHOUT DUE
PROCESS OF LAW.

POINT II.
THE COMMISSION DID NOT ACT ARBITRARILY OR EX PARTE BUT RATHER FOLLOWED
THE PROCEDURE SET UP BY STATUTE.
POINT III.
THE AWARD IS NOT CONTRARY TO THE
EVIDENCE AND THE LAW.
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POINT IV.
INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION FINDINGS
FACTS ARE CONCLUSIVE AND FINAL.

OF

POINT V.
PLAINTIFF'S POINT NO. IV HAS NO PARTICULAR APPLICATION HERE.
ARGUMENT
POINT I.
PLAINTIF:F WAS NOT DEPRIVED OF LIFE,
LIBERTY, OR PROPERTY WITHOUT DUE
PROCESS OF LAW.
In answer to plaintiff's argument I. (plaintiff's brief,
pages four and five and six), the procedure to be followed
in such cases is duly set up by statute and/or the constitution of the state of Utah; said procedure therefore constitutes due process of law; and said procedure was
followed in detail in this matter.
Section 35-1-31, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, cited by
plaintiff (plaintiff's brief, page five) as legal proof that the
commission's acts herein were a "complete nullity" is
not applicable in any way to this case, as is evident on
its face. Plaintiff has questioned the authority of the
referee to take testimony.
It is well established by law, decision of this court,

and custom, that the Industrial Commission does have the
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power and authority to delegate to a deputy or a member
of the commission the power under the Workmen's Compensation Act to take testimony in such matters. This
practice has been followed almost universally by the Industrial Commission since its inception in 1917. In addition, Section 35-1-10, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, gives
the commission the power to adopt rules and regulations
governing procedure before it, and Section 35-1-11, Utah
Code Annotated, 1953, authorizes the commission to employ a secretary, examiners, experts, clerks, physicians,
stenographers, and other assistants.
In Utah Copper Company vs. Industrial Commission
of Utah, et al, 193 P 23 (decided October 22, 1920), this
court held that the Industrial Commission may delegate
to a deputy the power under the Workmen's Compensation Act to take testimony. In that case, testimony upon
which an_ award was made was taken before a referee,
who was not even a member of the commission. Appellant's counsel objected on grounds that the commission
had no power or authority to delegate to a referee the
right to hear testimony, moved to stay the proceedings,
and requested that the application be heard before the
commission or some members thereof. This court held
that the commission could appoint a referee to take the
testimony, but that the referee does not and can not make
any award or make any binding order respecting an award.
In the instant case, the referee was the chairman of the
Industrial Commission, but he made no decision or award.
The findings, conclusions and order were made and signed
by the entire commission (R-17, R-18, R-19). This practice
of designating one member as a referee or a non-member
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referee to take testimony is almost universally followed
by most of the administrative commissions of the Utah
state government. We submit that a requirement that all
commissioners be present at all hearings, wherever held,
would be expensive and would work an almost impossible
hardship on them in the conduct of their official duties.
POINT II.
THE COMMISSION DID NOT ACT ARBITRARILY OR EX PARTE BUT RATHER FOLLOWED
THE PROCEDURE SET UP BY STATUTE.
Much of the argument which could be advanced under
this point is contained in the foregoing under Point I. of
this brief. From the outset this claim was handled in detail by the commission in the manner set up by statute
as the record in this case shows. The action and decision
of the commission were based on the investigation of medical men who were appointed and who conducted their
inquiries in accordance with law. A hearing was given
plaintiff as soon as he requested one after he had taken
a futile side jaunt into the district court, and any and all
statements made by the commissibn or its chairman were
not opinions but were based upon the scientific findings
of highly qualified medical men duly appointed to make
such findings. Plaintiff attempts to show bias on the part
of the commission chairman, but this honorable court has
known Chairman Wiesley and his record over a period of
18 years. We do not feel it is necessary to defend his performance and his record so well known to this court.
Plaintiff attempts to attack the admissibility, validity,
or competence of the medical panel's report, and by in-
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ference the reports by Dr. Okelberry, to be found in the
record. The basis of this attack is not clearly stated, but
it is indicated by plaintiff that the medical panel report
was influenced by the commission chairman and that it
was not made under oath. There is no law or custom
which requires such reports to be made under oath.
As to the admissibility and competence of the medical
panel's report, this court has held such reports admissible
and competent under similar circumstances.
In Uta-Carbon Coal Company et al, vs. Industrial Commission, et al, 104 U t. 567, 140 P2nd (decided by this court
July 29, 1943), plaintiff attacks the competence of X-rays
and a diagnosis report made to the Industrial Commission
by an X-ray specialist to whom the employee had been
sent by the Industrial Commission pursuant to statutory
requirement.
Concerning it, this court says, in part:
"It is our opinion that a report of this type
comes within the exception to the hearsay rule and
is such a one as is described in Rule 516, American
Law Institute's Model Code of Evidence, pages 275,
276, to wit: . . . evidence of a writing made as a
record, report, or memorandum of facts and conclusions concerning an act, event, or condition...
is admissible as tending to prove the truth of each
matt~r stated ~herein in compliance with statutory
requirements If . . . (a) the maker of the writing
wa~ duly authori.zed pursuant to statute to perform
designated functiOn~, performance of which by persons not so authorized was forbidden by statute,
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and was required by statute to file a written report
in a designated place or office setting forth specified matters relating to the performance of those
functions and the persons or things connected
therewith, and (b) the writing was made and filed
by him as a report so required by the statute."
This is exactly the case now before the court with the
medical panel report. It was required by Section 35-1-77,
Utah Code Annotated, 1953, and the procedure set up there
was followed.
We believe that the law is well established that in
civil code procedure it is the general rule that all documents and writings required by statutes and prepared and
filed in accordance therewith are prima facie evidence of
what they contain. They, of course, can be challenged by
other evidence or their contents attacked or contradicted
or refuted by proper evidence, but otherwise they stand
as evidence for what they purport to be.
The three medical panel doctors were present at the
hearing to be available to the plaintiff for examination or
cross-examination pursuant to plaintiff's written request
(R-22), but at the hearing plaintiff decided against crossexamining any of the medical panel doctors or questioning
their report. And plaintiff's failure to in any way question
the panel physicians or their report was no oversight, it
was more of an adamant refusal to do so. Note exchange
between plaintiff's counsel, Mr. Oliver, and referee (R-41,
beginning line 20):
"MR OLIVER: I'll call Mr. Hackford.

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

12
THE REFEREE: Just a moment. We have these
three panel doctors here. Do you want to crossexamine them?
MR. OLIVER: No.
THE REFEREE: You don't?
MR. OLIVER: No.
THE REFEREE: You should have told us. These
people cost money to bring them up here.
MR. OLIVER: I didn't ask you to bring them up
here.
THE REFEREE: We have to under the law. If
you don't want to cross-examine them, we'll
excuse them.
MR. OLIVER: No. I don't have any cross-examination."
(Discussion off the record).
"THE REFEREE: You may proceed."
During the discussion off the record and again later
on during the hearing and on the record, counsel for the
employer was assured by the referee that the case history
and the medical panel report were in evidence as part of
the record. At page 50, beginning on line 9, there is thi~
exchange:
"MR. OLIVER: I believe you may cross-examine
(the plaintiff was on the stand).
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MR. ROBINSON: Mr. Chairman, we think the record has the case history of this. Is there any
point in going into it here?
THE REFEREE: No.
MR. ROBINSON: His refusal to go to Dr. Okelberry
on ceTtain occasions and to accept the treatments suggested?
MR. OLIVER: Just a minute. I object to that.
MR. ROBINSON: I'm asking a question.
THE REFEREE: Now wait a minute, both of you.
The Supmere Court of the state of Utah says
everything in this record is in evidence.
MR. OLIVER: Well, the medical report is not in
evidence. The statute prohibits it.
THE REFEREE: No, it isn't prohibited.
MR. ROBINSON: I didn't want to unnecessarily
prolong this hearing if it's all repetitious.
THE REFEREE: It's in.
MR. ROBINSON: If the case history is in the record (and) the medical report of the panel, I
only have one or two questions, and those are
these."
Even though this court had not held that writings and
documents required by law are admissible as evidence
(Uta-Carbon Coal Co. vs. Industrial Commission, supra),

the referee, acting for and on behalf of the commission, was
within his authority in ruling that the medical panel re-
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port and documents giving the case history of the claim
were, as part of the record, in evidence.
Section 35-1-88, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, says:
"Rules of evidence before commission. The
commission shall not be bound by the usual common law or statutory rules of evidence, or by any
technical or formal rules of procedure, other than
as herein provided; but may make its investigations
in such matter as in its judgment is best calculated
to ascertain the substantial rights of the parties
and to carry out justly the spirit of this title."
Thus the commission did not act arbitrarily or ex
parte in deciding this case. All the medical reports and
facts were weighed, a medical panel of three outstanding
physicians and surgeons were ordered to investigate and
report, and then a hearing was held, at which hearing
testimony of plaintiff's own medical witnesses in no way
contradicted, but rather agreed with the findings of Dr.
Okelberry and the medical panel, which was not at variance with Dr. Okelberry's findings.
Dr. L. H. 0. Stobbe, plaintiff's principal medical witness, testified in response to plaintiff counsel's questioning
(R-29):
"Q. Did you examine his back?

A. Yes.
Q. What condition did you find there?

A. As said before, cyposis (?) and scoliosis. Tilting.
Dimpling.
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Q. And Doctor, did you determine the cause of that

condition
A. We X-rayed his back, and found there a degenerative arthritis involving the intervertebral
discs between the 11th and 12th dorsal vertabra, and between the 12th dorsal and the first
lumbar vertebra. Otherwise we found a fairly
normal spine.
Q. From your examination of the back that you

have just described, did you determine from
your examination whether it had ever been
broken at any time? Or fractured?
A. No, sir I couldn't find that. Furthermore, the
hip regions and pelvic areas were surprisingly
good considering the general condition of the
patient."
And then, under cross-examination of Dr., Stobbe by
employer's counsel: (R-33).
"Q. Dr. Stobbe, did you in your examination de-

termine what injury had occured from the
accident?
A. I'm afraid I couldn't. It was too far removed
from the time of the accident. I discussed this
with Dr. Okelberry and with the Deseret Livestock Company on February 4, 1960.
Q. Would you disagree with Dr. Okelberry in any

of his findings, after your examination?
A. I think there was nothing there for us to disagree on."
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POINT III.
THE AWARD IS NOT CONTRARY TO THE
EVIDENCE AND THE LAW.
Most of plaintiff's arguments and citations under his
point numbered III. are either not applicable here or have
been answered herein above.
Plaintiff's allegation that there was a prolonged delay
between the time he requested a hearing March 31, 1960
(after his meandering into the district court) and the hearing date, May 16, 1960, is not well founded. The hearing
was called by the commission on April 19, 1960, only 19
days after the date of plaintiff's request and was held 26
days thereafter, a total lapse of 45 days. The demands of
proper notice would consume this amount of time, and
for plaintiff's counsel to complain over this short lapse of
time and attempt to make it reversible error is the height
of indelicacy after he wasted nearly six months in "offside maneuvering."
Plaintiff (on page 12 of his brief) claims he had no
pre-hearing knowledge of a letter written to the employer
by Dr. Okelberry on July 6, 1959 (R-9), a copy of which
was sent to the Industrial Commission by the doctor, and
plaintiff alleges this lack of knowledge on his part to be
reversible error. Plaintiff's counsel may be entitled to a
word of regret from Deseret Livestock Company if he did
not get a copy of this letter, and in such case an apology
is hereby extended on behalf of the company. But whether
or not plaintiff had pre-hearing knowledge of the July 6,
1959 letter from Dr. Okelberry is immaterial to the decis-
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ion in this case, since it was not an official writing nor
one required by statute. The medical panel report was
the official writing required by the statute, and when its
finding and conclusions were not in any way contradicted
or varied by the other testimony, it became the basis of
the commission's award.
Plaintiff makes no claim that he did not have knowledge of or a copy of the medical panel report, and, of
course, he did have both, as the record shows he objected
to the report (R-20).
Plaintiff's brief makes a somewhat half-hearted attempt to show that plaintiff's present physical condition
(misalignment and arthritis of the spine) was caused by
the accident.
There is not one scintilla of evidence anywhere in the
record that the accident injured plaintiff's spine. In fact,
every attempt by plaintiff counsel to drag an injured spine
into his case has been completely frustrated by the testimony of even his own expert witnesses (Dr. Stobbe testimony, R-29, R-30, supra). And Dr. Hugh Wayman, plaintiff's other medical witness, testified on direct examination
by plantiff counsel (R-40):
"Q. Well assume, Doctor, that Mr. Hackford had
been in an accident where a wagon wheel ran
over him and broke his back in, that location.
Would that cause it?

A. Well, I see no sign of breaks at all. I only see
misalignment in them. The accident as you
speak of could cause this misalignment."
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And then on cross-examination, Dr. Wayman said
(R-41):
"Q. You say it could cause it but you also say theTe

are also other things that could cause that
misalignment, Doctor?
A. I have found the same condition in some cases
that were not run over."
In this connection, it should be remembered that Dr.
Wayman first examined the plaintiff sometime "in 1958"
(R-36, line 19) and that he made his first X-rays of plaintiff "'probably nine months after I checked him first."
(R-37). So these first X-rays by Dr. Wayman were taken
12 to 20 months afteT the accident and would be of little
use in determining what damage the accident had caused
to the spine.

POINT IV.
INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION FINDINGS
FACTS ARE CONCLUSIVE AND FINAL.

OF

As against plaintiff's weak and futile attempts to
blame the accident for plaintiff's present physical condition, we have a positive finding of fact by the Industrial
Commission that "any disability over and above the 15
per cent loss of bodily function was caused by degenerative arthritis not related to or aggravated by the injury
of December 31, 1957." (R-62).
Section 35-1-85, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, recites:
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" ... After each formal hearing, it shall be the
duty of the commission to make findings of fact
and conclusions of law in writing and file the same
with its secretary. The findings of fact and conclusions of the commission on questions of fact shall
be conclusive and final and shall not be subject to
review; such questions of fact shall include ultimate facts and the findings and conclusions of the
commission ... "
This question was ruled upon most recently by this
court in the case of Park Utah Consolidated Mines Co. vs.
Industrial Commission, 84 Ut. 481, 36 P.2d 972, wherein
the court said in part:
" ... In the determining of facts the conclusions
of the commission are like the verdict of a jury,
and will not be interfered with by this court when
supported by some substantial evidence."
We submit that under the case and statute cited, the
Industrial Commission's findings of fact in this case are
conclusive and final and are not subject to review.

POINT V.
PLAINTIFF'S POINT NO. IV HAS NO PARTICULAR APPLICATION HERE.
Plaintiff's point No. 1V. to the effect
Will Provide a Remedy Where None Exists
not be raised in this appeal. Since the relief
and the proceeding thereunder is purely
equity or equitable remedy is available.

that "Equity
at Law" cansought below
statutory, no
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CONCLUSION
The only issue before this court is the degree of permanent disability resulting from the accident. The plaintiff
claims that he is totally and permanently disabled but has
utterly failed to prove that his total disability, if such
exists, is the result of the accident.
On the other hand, the Industrial Commission, as the
legally constituted finder of the facts, has determined that
plaintiff's disability resulting from the accident is 15 per
cent loss of bodily function and made an award accordingly. This determination is based principally on the investigation and findings of a medical panel of three outstanding
medical men, and on the supporting report of Dr. A. M.
Okelberry and the supporting testimony of Dr. L. ·H. 0.
Stobbe, the plaintiff's own witness.
\

Under all the circumstances, we submit that this finding of fact and the award which was made by the commission pursuant thereto are conclusive and final, and should
accordingly be affirmed.
Respectfully submitted,
WALTER L. BUDGE,
Attorney General
GORDON A MADSEN
Assistant Attorne; General
DAVID A. ROBINSON,

Attorneys for Defendant
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